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I. INTRODUCTION
Contributors to the Symposium on revising the Model Penal Code in the
previous issue of the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law discussed deficiencies in
the original Code and focused on specific rules or offenses that may merit revision
or elimination.' But another, perhaps even more important, reform agenda would
target the significant issues about which the Code provides little, if any, guidance.
This Commentary does not discuss the Model Penal Code's errors so much as its
omissions, focusing on two issues that, in my view, the original Code did not
sufficiently address.
Though the Model Penal Code does an excellent job setting out culpability
rules and defining specific offenses and defenses, it falls short in establishing rules
for assigning a specific amount of punishment once an offense has been
committed. As Part II of this Commentary discusses, the Code's grading scheme
for individual offenses is crude, and the Code generally pays little attention to the
question of how to allocate the liability-assignment function between grading and
sentencing rules. Part III notes that the Code's scheme for imposing liability on
more than one offense is practically undeveloped, and it offers some tentative
recommendations for improvement in that area.
These two issues are related to, but are by no means fully addressed by, the
American Law Institute's (ALl) current project to revise the Code's sentencing
structure.2 Though that project is highly welcome and likely to develop
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significant reforms, full resolution of the grading and multiple-offense issues
discussed here is beyond even its suitably lofty ambitions. Because both issues
operate along the intersection of two different functions of a criminal code-
regulating the imposition of liability, and regulating the extent of liability when
imposed-each necessitates an analysis of the interplay between those two
functions. Addressing one function in vacuo cannot resolve the grading and
multiple-offense problems; indeed, such an approach is troublesome precisely
because it tends to obscure their very existence.
The original Code's organization, however, partitions the two functions of
defining liability and establishing punishment,3 and the Code's drafters generally
addressed them in isolation.4 The ALI's roadmap Sentencing Revision Plan points
out and criticizes this feature of the original Code,5 and is not alone in doing so.6
Yet the sentencing reform project's inherent limitations of scope force it to
maintain and perpetuate that troublesome differentiation. The project is designed
to leave undisturbed the original Code's Special Part,7 and the Plan even hints that
the final proposals will effectively amount to a stand-alone document bearing only
a circumstantial relationship to the rest of the Code.
8
The best means of addressing the relation between offense-defining and
offense-punishing rules would be a full revision, considering at once the total array
of purposes that the Code, and each of its parts, must satisfy. The second-best
option for these purposes would probably not be to deal with sentencing rules first,
but rather to reconsider the Special Part with an eye toward the impact of offense
3 See id. at 530 ("The two subjects [of defining liability rules and establishing punishment once
liability has been found], thus loosely classified, are segregated nearly entirely in the Code's
organization.").
4 See id. at 530 n.4 ("There is evidence ... that the distinction between guilt determinations
and decisions about penalty consequences was clearly drawn in the minds of the Code's original
drafters.").
5 See id. ("These are crude categorizations that ignore many interrelationships between crime
definitions and punishment consequences.").
6 See Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge of
the Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 297, 309-11 (1998) (noting that MPC effectively segregated
categories of offense-definition and sentence-determination and arguing that special parts of criminal
codes should incorporate greater consideration of penalty consequences), cited in MPC Sentencing
Revision Plan, supra note 2, at 530 n.4.
7 See MPC Sentencing Revision Plan, supra note 2, at 530 (expressing hope that after the
project, Code readers will be able to "collate areas of new drafting with areas left untouched" and
noting that "it should be possible to rework the sentencing and corrections articles without greatly
disturbing the 'general' and 'special' parts of the existing Code, which include the Code's best
known and most influential provisions"). See generally id. at 529-32 (setting out plan to concentrate
revisions centrally, if not exclusively, on "sentencing and corrections" articles of Code, while leaving
"liability" articles intact); id. at 604-09 (excluding all of Special Part, except § 210.6 (relating to
capital punishment for murder), from list of provisions that are "candidates for amendment").
8 See id. at 528 n.3 ("[T]he same subject matters might be addressed in a wholly-new 'Model
Sentencing Act' or 'Model Sentencing and Corrections Act."').
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definitions and grades at sentencing. 9 After all, as the experience of sentencing
reform at the federal level instructs, failure to first address the underlying
weaknesses of a code's Special Part will likely make the sentencing-reform project
harder and the resulting product worse; such sentencing reforms have struggled to
do through guidelines what the code could and should have done in defining and
grading offenses.
II. THE INEFFECTIVE-GRADING PROBLEM
Although the Model Penal Code made major strides in articulating general
principles and defining specific offenses, the Code comes up short in assigning
specific ranges of liability for offenses. The potential availability of more specific
sentencing guidelines does not eliminate a criminal code's primary role in
establishing the general range of punishment due for an offense by specifying its
grade: that is, its relative seriousness compared to other offenses. Grading
provides a first approximation of an appropriate punishment that is then refined in
the sentencing process. Grading also categorically excludes other possible
punishments deemed inappropriate.
The Code's advances in defining offenses are partially undermined by its
failure to guide or cabin judicial discretion over the amount of punishment to be
imposed for the crime. Clear, precise rules for determining what offense has been
committed are of little value if the consequences of that determination differ little,
or not at all, from the consequences of imposing liability for an entirely different
offense. In fact, a code with few grading categories will undermine seemingly
clear and precise offense rules by eliminating any incentive for judges and juries to
take pains in distinguishing varying levels of harm or culpability among offenses,
because no available grading distinctions would capture and reflect the offense
distinction.
At the most fundamental level, examining the sophistication of a grading
scheme serves only as a proxy for a more thorough review of the appropriateness
of a criminal code's specific grading determinations. Even so, the overall scheme
itself merits attention, for a system of grading categories has practical value in
forcing the legislature to consider the relative seriousness of an offense vis-a-vis
other offenses when assigning grades. Obviously, having fewer grading categories
means that legislative determinations, and an adjudicator's subsequent punishment
measures, will become more inexact (and inaccurate).
The significance of grading, and the limits of relying on sentencing rules, are
highlighted by the recent landmark case of Apprendi v. New Jersey1° and its
progeny. This line of cases has reaffirmed that an offense's elements, to which the
relevant grade applies, must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt,
9 Cf id. at 625 (noting the "downside of fashioning a sentencing structure within the relatively
broad grading framework of the original Code").
'0 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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while sentencing factors may be, and often are, satisfied through proof to the judge
by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, establishing the offense
committed, and thereby establishing the general range of liability as determined by
the offense's grade, provides the only available means for the jury to express itself
on the issue of the seriousness of a defendant's offense. Specific sentencing
guidelines pick up the slack of wide, loose offense grades to define a precise level
of liability for any given offender. Consequently, determining liability using
guidelines, rather than offense grades, effectively shifts authority away from the
more traditional democratic institutions-the legislature, which defines offenses,
and the jury, which must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant
has committed one-toward prosecutors and judges.
The Model Penal Code defines only five offense grades: first-degree felony,
second-degree felony, third-degree felony, misdemeanor, and petty misdemeanor."
In contrast, current state codes commonly recognize twice as many grades, which
itself serves as an indication of how flawed even the Code-based states found the
Code's grading approach.' 2 Even ten categories of offenses are far fewer than the
number of grades a code might reasonably employ to distinguish cases of different
seriousness. The United States Sentencing Guidelines, for example, recognize
forty-three levels of offense severity;13 though such complexity (especially as
reflected in those Guidelines) is not always necessary or even desirable, it
highlights the feasibility of refining the current Code's grading scheme.
By placing the full range of offenses into only five categories, the Code
drastically curtails the potential, and proper, role of grading in the liability-
assigning process. Even if the offense grades carried specified minimum
sentences-and under the Code, they do not-the range between the maximum and
minimum sentences would have to be enormous to include the wide range of
offenses covered by each of the five grades. Beyond the importance of establishing
a specific sentence range, the grading of an offense can also provide an important
public statement of the offense's relative seriousness. But with only three grades
of felonies and two grades of misdemeanors, each grade is sure to include offenses
of different seriousness. A project to revise the Model Penal Code would offer a
chance to thoughtfully assess the relative seriousness of each offense and impose
an appropriate corresponding grade.
In the age of Apprendi, the importance of taking grading seriously has become
even more apparent, for that case underscores the consequences of defining offense
elements and sentencing factors. Yet Apprendi, as well as much of the scholarly
1 See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 6 (1985).
12 See, e.g., ARz. REV. STAT. § 13-601 (1989) (10 grades of offense); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-
1-105, 18-1-106, 18-1-107 (1986) (10 grades); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4201, 4202, 4203 (1994)
(10 grades); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-5-1 (West 1993) (11 grades); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-
105, 28-106 (1995) (15 grades); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 55.05, 55.10(3) (McKinney 1998) (10 grades);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.02 (West 1998) (12 grades); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1, 22-6-2,
22-6-7 (Michie 1978) (10 grades); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-9 (Michie 1996) (10 grades).
13 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2003).
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commentary on the subject, 14 focuses attention on the constitutional issues and
leaves underdeveloped the underlying normative question: which factual issues
bearing on criminal liability should be defined as offense elements, and which are
more suitable for resolution by the court as sentencing factors? Under Apprendi's
constitutional rules, legislatures retain considerable discretion to define offenses
and sentencing factors, and thus frequently will be free to define a given fact either
as an element or as a sentencing factor. What legislatures still need are substantive
criteria to help them decide among constitutionally permissible options.
Although the current ALl sentencing-reform project recognizes the issues
Apprendi raises and laudably seeks to address them, the cabined focus of that
project allows only a partial resolution. The Plan recognizes that a revised Code
must not only achieve constitutional conformity with Apprendi, but "[m]ore
important still, [it] must confront issues raised by Apprendi on a prudential,
subconstitutional level."' 15 At the same time, the Plan rather incongruously asserts
that after the sentencing project is complete, "[ilt will likely be possible to retain
the basic grading schema of the original Code."'16  But if the project does not
confront the original Code's grading system, it cannot confront the most
significant "prudential, subconstitutional" issue Apprendi raises: the issue of how
best to distribute punishment-assigning power between the court and the jury.' 7 It
14 See, e.g., Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1467
(2001); cf Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 289, 299 (1992)
("There has been surprisingly little scholarly discussion about which issues should be decided at
sentencing instead of at trial.").
Some commentary, however, has begun to explore the underlying substantive issues. See, e.g.,
Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 389, 392 (2002) (putting forward
"principled basis on which to distinguish a jury's determination of facts in support of punishment
from a judge's determination of facts in support of punishment" and "appeal[ing] to the fundamental
requirements of just punishment in order to restore both the due process right to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment jury right").
15 MPC Sentencing Revision Plan, supra note 2, at 531; see also id. at 637 (suggesting that "a
redraft could treat Apprendi as an invitation to revisit fundamental issues of factfinding relevant to
punishment," though listing only one candidate for such re-evaluation: the facts necessary to impose
an extended term of confinement under the MPC); cf id. at 667 ("It is an understatement to say that a
revised Model Penal Code must give more attention than the original Code to the twin issues of (1)
segregating 'sentencing facts' and 'trial facts' and (2) process at sentencing.").
16 Id. at 531; see also id. at 622-26; id. at 667 ("Section 7.07 by itself cannot settle the question
of which facts ought to be determined at sentencing. Such policy decisions must also be advanced in
the definitions of substantive crimes, [among other places.]") (emphasis added).
17 Although my discussion focuses on the issue of who, judge or jury, might best serve as
decisionmaker for specific issues, there are also various other procedural, political, and practical
factors at stake in the allocation of issues between grading and sentencing. For example, offense
elements are subject to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas the evidentiary burden for
sentencing factors may be lower; the due process and evidentiary rules that apply at sentencing may
also be looser than, or otherwise different from, those that apply at trial. See, e.g., Herman, supra
note 14, at 289-92 (noting procedural distinctions between trial and sentencing in federal system).
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is difficult to see how a revision could undertake, much less accomplish, the
project of reallocating that power if it modifies only the rules governing the
sentencing judge's authority after a jury's conviction vote, while leaving unaltered
the significance of that vote for purposes of determining an offender's punishment.
Expanding the project to re-examine the relations between offense definition,
offense grading, and sentencing rules would enable a fuller evaluation of the
proper roles of judge and jury. Indeed, such a project could also weigh, and make
policy decisions based on, the impact of the Code's structure on other institutional
players; for example, prosecutors' power may be affected as much or more by the
definition and grade of offenses-and even the quantity of available offenses-as
by the applicable sentencing rules.1
8
The time has come for serious reconsideration of how we should allocate
decisionmaking authority among the relevant institutional players. But because the
existing Code tends to define offenses broadly and has relatively few offense
grades, it provides little guidance on these matters. A complete Code revision
would enable drafters to revisit the question of offense definition with the
significance of the grading-versus-sentencing issue in stark relief. Such a project
could generate, at the very least, a useful debate about how to distribute the
punishment-assigning role between jury and judge, and the resulting Code could
provide a template for how to implement the chosen distributive theory.
III. THE MULTIPLE-OFFENSE-LIABILITY PROBLEM
No state has yet enacted a clear and comprehensive statute that sets out in
detail an underlying basis or practical method for punishing multiple offenses. The
Model Penal Code is no different. The problem of imposing multiple liability
involves two distinct issues. The first concerns whether and when a given offender
may be convicted of two different crimes (an issue complicated when the two
crimes are based on the same or overlapping conduct). Second, where multiple
liability is appropriate, the question arises as to how much total liability should be
imposed for the offenses.
My focus on the allocation of authority between judge and jury is not intended to minimize or ignore
these other critical ramifications of the grading-versus-sentencing decision.
A thorough analysis of the proper allocations of issues between grading and sentencing would
obviously need to be alert to all of these factors. Although I am interested in developing such an
analysis, limitations of space preclude me from doing so here. For purposes of this Commentary, I
seek only to highlight the issue, not to resolve it.
18 Cf MPC Sentencing Revision Plan, supra note 2, at 534 n. 11 ("A related question is whether
a revised Code should reach into the relatively uncharted territory of the regulation of prosecutorial
charging discretion and the plea bargaining process, on the theory that choices made at these stages
are forms of sentencing discretion. There is much to be said for the view that sentencing reforms risk
unintended consequences if they regulate the discretionary authority of judges and other official
decisionmakers, yet attempt no parallel regulation of the authority of prosecutors.").
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A. Establishing Multiple Liability: When Is It Proper?
Instead of attempting to set out fundamental principles concerning multiple
liability, the Model Penal Code, like most legislative efforts, ultimately leans on
the notion of an "included offense." 19 The "included offense" concept-an idea
borrowed from double jeopardy law, which itself is murky, if not incoherent-has
not proven useful or clear as a guide to determining when multiple liability is
appropriate. Accordingly, in states whose codes are based on the Model Penal
Code, decisions regarding the propriety of imposing multiple liability have
effectively been delegated to the courts, with predictably unpredictable results.
This issue is far too critical to allow ad hoc decisionmaking rather than at least
trying to provide legislative guidelines or an explanation of suitable criteria.
The significance of this "liability-determination" issue is obscured by the
manner in which most states' existing sentencing schemes deal with the "liability-
imposition" issue. As a practical matter, both issues can effectively be swept
under the rug at once: because nearly all states allow-and frequently require-
concurrent sentences for most multiple offenses, a court can often enter additional
convictions that have no practical consequence in terms of the defendant's total
punishment. But if we take seriously the project of imposing additional liability
for all the distinct harms (and only the distinct harms) a defendant has caused, we
also need to take care in describing the conditions under which multiple liability is,
or is not, allowed.
Consider the case where an offense has both a "base offense" and an
aggravating factor (say, causing physical injury) that increases the offense's grade,
and there is another offense that specifically prohibits the aggravating factor
(causing injury). The second offense and the aggravated form of the first offense
(considered as a whole) may each require something that the other does not-thus,
neither is technically an included offense of the other. Even so, using the same
harm to satisfy both the aggravating factor and the second offense may amount to
double counting of a single harm.
On the other hand, there may also be cases where one offense is an included
offense of another, but each offense represents a distinct harm or wrongful act
under the facts of the case. One recurring and difficult issue for the courts under
included-offense analysis has been whether there can be liability for two offenses
where one includes efforts toward the other: for example, burglary, which requires
an intent to commit a felony, and the subsequent felony. Because the purpose of a
distinct burglary offense is to punish the intrusion itself, which represents an
independent harm from the later felony, it would seem to make sense that the later
felony should not be discounted or merged into the burglary offense. The same is
true of robbery, which punishes the discrete harm of intimidation and fear that
exists separately from the attendant theft.
19 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(1), (4) (1985).
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Developing a more coherent and more just approach than the inadequate
included-offense analysis requires facing squarely the challenge of determining
what is, and what is not, a distinct harm meriting separate liability. Consider the
following possibility:
Conviction When the Defendant Satisfies the Requirements of
More than One Offense or Grade.
(1) Limitations on Conviction for Multiple Related Offenses.
The trier of fact may find a defendant guilty of any offense, or
grade of an offense, for which he satisfies the requirements for
liability, but the court shall not enter a judgment of conviction
for more than one of any two offenses if:
(a) the two offenses are based on the same conduct and:
(i) the harm or wrong of one offense is:
(A) entirely accounted for by the other
offense, or
(B) of the same kind, but lesser degree, than
that of the other offense; or
(ii) the two offenses differ only in that:
(A) one is defined to prohibit a designated
kind of conduct generally and another to
prohibit a specific instance of such conduct,
or
(B) one requires a lesser kind of culpability
than the other; or
(iii) the offenses are defined as a continuing course
of conduct and the defendant's course of conduct
was uninterrupted, unless the law provides that
specific periods of such conduct constitute
separate offenses[.] 20
In many respects, this provision is similar to the Model Penal Code's
provision. There is one key difference, however. In addition to dealing with the
particular ways in which the conduct involved in one offense might merely
duplicate or overlap with that of the other offense, the provision asks whether the
gravamen of one offense duplicates that of another.
The provision above does not refer to the concept of an "included offense."
Today the included-offense concept is used for two different purposes: first, it
20 Proposed ILL. CRIM. CODE § 254(l)(a) (2003); see also proposed Ky. PENAL CODE
§ 502.254(1)(a) (2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/kentucky/ (similar
provision). Subsequent subsections 254(1)(b)-(e), not reproduced here, address distinct and
somewhat more well-settled prohibitions on multiple liability, as in precluding punishment for both
an inchoate offense and the subsequent completed offense.
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specifies when the jury may be instructed on an offense that was not specifically
charged; second, it defines a rule limiting entry of conviction for multiple offenses.
Yet these two purposes are conceptually distinct. The notion of an included
offense may well be useful in the context of jury instructions, but as discussed
above, it is unhelpful in resolving the question of when multiple liability should be
allowed.
The provision above could be implemented without reference to the particular
facts of specific cases. Like the included-offense issue, the rules in the proposed
provision would present issues of law21 regarding how defined offenses relate to
each other-specifically, whether their relation is such that multiple liability is
appropriate, or whether imposing liability for one offense would needlessly and
improperly duplicate liability already imposed by a conviction for another offense.
Accordingly, a court's finding regarding the appropriateness of multiple
convictions for two separate offenses could be binding on all future cases
involving those same offenses, thereby enhancing predictability, stability, and
evenhandedness in the imposition of multiple liability.
Critically, because the provision's rules would apply only when two offenses
are "based on the same conduct," any bar on multiple convictions would govern
only subsequent cases where those two offenses were again based on the same
conduct. Multiple convictions for the two offenses would remain acceptable where
they are not both based on the same conduct. More broadly, and significantly, the
provision would not in any way limit convictions for related offenses arising out of
different conduct. For example, subsection (1)(a)(i)(A) would preclude assault
liability where the bodily harm involved consists solely of sexual penetration that
is accounted for by a sexual assault conviction. Multiple liability would be
appropriate, however, where the bodily harm involved is independent of the sexual
penetration, such as where the defendant beats the victim to facilitate, or in the
course of, a sexual assault.
Subsection (1)(a) of the provision imposes additional requirements, however,
so that multiple convictions are not barred for all situations where the same
conduct constitutes multiple offenses. Subsection (1)(a)(i)(A) precludes liability
for two offenses arising out of the same conduct where one offense is concerned
with a harm or wrong that is "entirely accounted for by" the other offense. Rather
than considering the theoretical possibility of committing one offense without
committing another, the proposed standard calls for a consideration of the relevant
offenses' purposes.
21 In some instances, the court might withhold jury instructions for an offense because the
multiple-liability provision would preclude a conviction anyway. To avoid the risk of a reversal
requiring a new trial, however, the court would probably prefer, in the usual case, to postpone such
determinations until after the jury has returned its verdicts.
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B. Imposing Multiple Liability: How Much Is Proper?
Even after a new Code has developed rules for determining whether to assign
liability for multiple offenses, the question of how much liability to assign remains.
As noted above, courts typically impose concurrent sentences for multiple offenses
of conviction, but that system has the obvious and pervasive flaw of trivializing, to
the point of complete irrelevance, every offense other than the most serious one. A
sensible liability scheme should require, or at least allow, some additional
punishment for each such harm-although perhaps incrementally reduced
punishment instead of the equally crude alternative of full consecutive sentences
for each offense. There should be no "free" violations, but neither should there be
double-counting of any violation because of technically separate, but truly
overlapping, offenses.
As to this second question-not whether to impose liability, but how much to
impose-sentencing reform by itself may make (and to some extent, has already
made22) a significant contribution. The current Model Penal Code sentencing-
reform project seems poised to confront this issue seriously, although the
preliminary Plan for the project hints at a continuing reliance on the concurrent-
consecutive dichotomy.
We must not, however, consider sentencing to be the entire problem here, nor
sentencing rules the exclusive (or the best) means of resolving the problem. As
mentioned earlier, the full and proper consideration of multiple-liability issues
requires that we simultaneously confront the questions of how offenses are
punished and how they are defined. The question of how much to punish multiple
offenses should arise only after a comprehensive consideration of the conceptually
prior question of when we should hold that multiple offenses have even occurred,
rather than just one of the offenses or, perhaps, an entirely different, better-defined
single offense. Our attention to the relationship between offenses will be
diminished if we accept as given current offense definitions and the basic rules for
deciding when multiple convictions may be imposed-as, significantly, the ALI's
sentencing-reform projectdoes.24
22 For example, modem sentencing guideline systems, such as the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, often have elaborate schemes for "grouping" related offenses to arrive at a combined
punishment level seeking to account for all of, and only, the independent discrete harms an offender's
conduct causes. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3DI.1-3D1.5 (2003). A full
examination of the accomplishments and inadequacies of such schemes is beyond the scope of this
Commentary. In any case, to a certain extent the schemes are only as good as the underlying offense
definitions that determine when multiple offenses exist to be "grouped," and the grades (and
constraints such as mandatory minimum or consecutive sentences) attaching to each.
23 See MPC Sentencing Revision Plan, supra note 2, at 663 (stating that "an updated Code
should seek to provide greater guidance to trial judges on the choice between concurrent and
consecutive punishments").
24 See id. at 663 (excluding from the list of provisions that are "candidates for amendment"
MPC § 1.07 (Method of Prosecution When Conduct Constitutes More Than One Offense)).
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Even as to sentencing in particular, a change of perspective is in order. We
should address the multiple-liability issue in the context of a scheme that looks
beyond the present consecutive-concurrent dichotomy, rather than by defining
sentencing rules predicated on that dichotomy.25 One possible approach is to draft
a provision like the following:
Authorized Sentence for Multiple Offenses.
When a defendant is being sentenced for more than one offense,
the cumulative authorized sentence for all of the offenses of
which he has been convicted is equal to:
(1) the sentence for the most serious offense,
(2) plus one-half the sentence for the next most serious offense,
(3) plus one-quarter the sentence for the next most serious
offense,
(4) plus one-eighth the sentence for the next most serious
offense,
(5) continuing in like manner for all offenses for which the
defendant has been convicted, thereby causing each additional
offense to increase the total authorized cumulative sentence, but
by a decreasing increment.26
Although the specific mathematical progression of the proposed provision's
scheme is certainly open to debate or further refinement, its general mechanism for
sentencing multiple convictions provides fairer punishment than the crude
consecutive-concurrent dichotomy on which most current sentencing schemes rely.
Such an intermediate approach to sentencing for multiple offenses ensures that
each additional offense leads to some increase in overall punishment while
avoiding raw aggregation of offenses into an unduly severe cumulative sentence.
I do not mean to suggest that either of the proposed provisions set out in this
Part is perfect or fully addresses the problems I have raised. Perhaps they are best
seen merely as a starting point for consideration and debate. That, indeed, is why I
suggest that such issues, and the resulting provisions, are ideal subjects for the
extended process of proposal, discussion, and modification that a project to revise
the entire Model Penal Code would entail.
25 Here again, existing sentencing reform has already made strides, moving beyond the
historical concurrent-consecutive limitations. For example, the federal Sentencing Guidelines enable
"partially consecutive" sentences for grouped offenses, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5GI.2(d) (2003), though this option was apparently available to federal judges (albeit rarely
employed) even prior to the Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Mizrachi, 48 F.3d 651, 654 n.1
(2d Cir. 1995) (noting availability of option prior to Guidelines).
26 Proposed ILL. CRIM. CODE § 906 (2003); see also proposed Ky. PENAL CODE § 509.906
(2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/kentucky/ (similar provision).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The original Model Penal Code represented an enormous step forward in
determining and articulating the underlying rules that should guide assignment of
criminal liability, and in defining individual criminal offenses. Two major issues
that it failed to address fully-the relationship between offense definitions and
sentencing rules, and the relationship between individual offenses when liability
for more than one offense is allowed under their definitions-are among the most
under-theorized areas in substantive criminal law. Both of these issues relate as
much, if not more, to how (and how much) we criminalize offenses than to what
acts and actors merit liability, and each is likely to benefit from the careful,
deliberative drafting process that would attend efforts to revise the Model Penal
Code.
